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ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, Roman. Abt. [ZRGR] 137 (2020)
V I
Teaching Roman Law in the 21st Century: 
A note on legal-historical 
education in the Netherlands
Von
Jan Hallebeek*)
Abstract: Can Roman law still be a useful part of the compulsory curricular programme 
for legal education in the Netherlands? At the beginning of the nineteenth century Roman 
law taught the student a further systematization of private law Later it was seen as an in-
troduction to present-day private law, irrespective of whether it was taught in a pandectistic 
or a more historical way For the second half of the twentieth century three divergent ap-
proaches could be discerned ie a ‘pandectistic’, a ‘neo-humanistic’ and a ‘legal histori-
cal’ one Given this until recently existing state of legal education, various premises can be 
formulated, which preferably should underlie the teaching of Roman law in the near future, 
viz an applicative approach, a connection with legal historical research, the awareness that 
the civilian tradition is not the only one and that it only started with the glossators, and 
avoiding anachronisms
Key Words: Legal education, History of Legal Scholarship, Roman law, Legal History, the 
Netherlands
I   I n t roduc t ion:  I s  t he re  a  f u t u re  for  Roma n law?
Is there a future for Roman law in Dutch law-schools? For a long period 
this seemed self-evident From the time the Corpus iuris civilis lost its sig-
nificance as a source of law1), and in the wake of the German Pandektenwis-
senschaft, Roman law continued to play an essential role in legal education 
in the Netherlands2) All law faculties had compulsory and usually extensive 
*) jhallebeek@vunl, Vrije Universiteit, 1081 HV Amsterdam, Netherlands
1) Wetboek Napoleon ingerigt voor het Koningrijk Holland (1809) art 3; Afschaf-
fingswet (1829) art 1
2) For the distinction between Pandektenwissenschaft and Pandectism see 
A . J.B.  Si rk s ,  War Mühlenbruch ein Pandektist?, in: H.­P.  Hafe rk a mp/ 
T.  Re pge n (eds.), Wie pandektistisch war die Pandektistik? Symposion aus An-
RA2020.indb   194 13.05.2020   18:43:07
Teaching Roman Law in the 21st Century 195
ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, Roman. Abt. [ZRGR] 137 (2020)
courses in Roman law Such courses were considered to be of great value for 
the formation of jurists, both future scholars and practitioners, especially 
with regard to understanding the system and legal dogmatics of contempo-
rary private law When, around the turn of the century, Roman law started to 
be taught in a more neo-humanistic manner, considerable attention was paid 
to reading and interpreting texts from the Digest Dealing with case materials 
made students distinguish between what was and was not legally relevant, 
thereby discovering the decisive legal principle substantiating the specific 
reply Moreover, Roman law developed the student’s ability to distinguish 
between a party’s position according to the law of obligations, on the one 
hand, and that according to the law of property, on the other. This made Ro-
man law a perfect introduction to contemporary private law
However, some decades ago, all of this was to become no longer obvi-
ous. The role of classics in secondary education has changed. The former 
Bildungsideal no longer applies and this may have had its effect in academic 
education. Subsequent curriculum reforms reduced the role of Roman law 
considerably Moreover, the programme for a full academic legal education 
was reduced from five to four years. Roman law had to give way to new com-
pulsory subjects, such as European law and Moot Court. In addition, first­
year students now had to complete time-absorbing courses in (legal) skills, 
often including skills of an elementary nature that were previously assumed 
to have been sufficiently developed at secondary school. Furthermore, teach-
ing Roman law was more generally threatened by a societal lack of historical 
interest, insufficient awareness of western history, a decreasing conviction 
that Roman law had a formative value, especially for future jurists, and an in-
creasing orientation towards legal practice at the expense of academic train-
ing Furthermore, if Roman law managed to survive as a compulsory course, 
it was now expected to show the historical development of law, rather than 
to develop the skills required for handling complicated cases of private law. 
Finally, a course in Roman law or legal history had to be completed, just like 
all law courses, within a short period of seven weeks
Should we fear that soon a new age will dawn, in which the capacity to read 
and understand Digest texts will have disappeared from Dutch law-schools? 
After all, if Roman law is no longer properly taught, scholarly expertise is 
also doomed to disappear; leaving the Corpus iuris civilis to a single col-
league in the Faculty of Humanities, who, by the nature of his field, will be 
lass des 80 Geburtstags von Klaus Luig am 11 September 2015, Tübingen 2017, 
185–204, 186
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– in the best case – less proficient in understanding the dogmatic subtleties of 
the Roman texts and in envisaging the practical implications of their abstract 
legal notions. This question bothers many a Romanist and legal historian 
nowadays
Yet, I think that Roman law or legal history can still be a useful part of the 
compulsory curricular programme It is important, however, to establish on 
which premises the teaching of Roman law should be based First we must 
understand the various opinions and persuasions which existed and exist as 
regards the teaching of Roman law. They constitute the background of our 
present­day considerations. Subsequently, we must see which purposes can 
be served by using Roman law in contemporary training of academic jurists, 
and what this implies for selecting materials, shaping courses and writing 
textbooks I restrict myself to the Netherlands with an occasional glimpse 
at Belgium, but there are manifold parallels elsewhere on the continent or 
in Scotland3)
I I   T he  t each i ng  of  Roma n law i n  t he  Net he r la nd s 
f rom t he  19 t h cent u r y  onwa rd s
When we look at the teaching of Roman law in the Netherlands from the 
19th century onwards, we can distinguish various stages Before describing 
these stages, it should be noted that in the 1870s and 1880s of the 19th century, 
Dutch universities introduced chairs for the history of indigenous law, estab-
lished after the example of the Germanistic branch of the Historical School 
The discipline was termed Oud­Vaderlands recht. While Roman law was 
confined to the law of the Corpus iuris civilis, Oud­Vaderlands recht focussed 
on what was considered to be the genuine indigenous law of our regions Nei-
ther scholars of Roman law, nor those of the history of indigenous law, were 
interested in the Roman­Dutch law of the early modern period. This implied 
that the study of the Old Authorities of Roman-Dutch law, such as Simon van 
Leeuwen (1626–1682), Johannes Voet (1647–1713) and Dionysius Godefridus 
van der Keessel (1738–1816), fell out of the curriculum, where they had had 
a standing place during the 18th century until the promulgation of the Code 
of 1809, for example, in courses on the ius hodiernum4)
3) A complicating factor exists in the fact that the nature of Roman law as taught 
may deviate from the scholarly research in the field of Roman law. As a consequence, 
the question how to shape Roman law teaching is often considered a separate, inde-
pendent question. In theory a Faculty of Law educates scholars, but de facto it has to 
turn out practitioners, mastering a number of distinct legal skills
4) It may also be noted here, that in the following survey the name of one of the 
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Initially, Roman law courses offered a pivotal contribution to legal educa-
tion. This had to do with the way positive private law was taught. The Code 
civil of 1804 and the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 were characterized by a sys-
tem and by dogmatics, derived from the law as previously in force in France 
and the Netherlands and as mapped out in scholarly literature Customary 
French law, as systematized by Robert­Joseph Pothier (1699–1772), as well 
as some French revolutionary achievements (equality of all citizens, contrac-
tual freedom and a single and absolute right of ownership), had shaped the 
structure and institutions of the patrimonial law of the Code civil. The latter, 
in its turn, together with some alterations derived from Roman-Dutch law 
(a traditionalistic system of transfer of ownership and some specific private 
delicts incorporated in the text of the Code during the 1830s) were deter-
minative for the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 1838 Accordingly, as regards their 
structure and terminology, the Code civil of 1804 and the Burgerlijk Wetboek 
of 1838 were settled in the tradition of early modern law, as to be found in 
the customs of Paris, Roman­Dutch law, the usus modernus pandectarum, 
etc. The Dutch professors of positive private law adopted the common prac-
tice of the French École de l’exégèse They simply discussed the private law 
materials according to their order in the Code. This holds good for scholars 
like Nicolaas Smallenburg (1761–1836) and Hendrik Nienhuis (1790–1862) 
Their teachings lacked a further reflection, such as in the German Histori-
cal School and pandectistic scholarship with their more abstract notions and 
theories. They made no attempt to introduce into their courses and textbooks 
further systematic elements or to develop more elaborate private law dog-
matics5) Dutch civil law lacked a book like the Handbuch des Französischen 
Civilrechts of Karl Salomo Zachariae von Lingenthal (1769–1843). This work 
made Jacob van Hall (1799–1859), professor of the Municipal University of 
Amsterdam, speak about ‘the salutary influence, which the elaboration of 
the French legislation in Germany and by German scholars entails for the 
scholarship of civil law in general’6)
greatest Dutch legal historians of the 20th century, Eduard Maurits Meijers (1880–
1954), is missing, since he never taught Roman law or legal history, nor wrote text-
books for these subjects
5) A  JB  Si rk s ,  Van Code Napoléon tot NBW, in: D  He i rbau t /G  Ma r t y n 
(eds), Napoleons nalatenschap, Tweehonderd jaar Burgerlijk Wetboek in België, 
Mechelen 2005, 323–336
6) Jacob van Hall in his review of KS Zachariae von Lingenthal, Handbuch des 
Französischen Civilrechts, 4th ed vol 1: “de weldadige invloed, welke de bearbei-
ding van de Fransche wetgeving in Duitschland en door Duitsche geleerden, op de 
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It was the Roman law courses which taught the student a further systema-
tization of private law and made them familiar with a repertory of abstract 
legal notions, which they could use when discussing the provisions of the 
Code. The value of Roman law textbooks, as those of Goudsmit and Mod-
derman7), both appointed shortly after 1860, lies in this specific function of 
teaching Roman law: imparting a command of refined and coherent concepts. 
By focusing on the system, the abstract legal notions and by adopting in their 
textbooks a ‘General Part’ (Allgemeiner Teil), these jurists by all means fol-
lowed the German Pandektenwissenschaft, later called Pandectism, at least 
in their teaching
In Germany, Pandectism was meant to provide the foundations for a future 
system of law, ie for the situation when Germany would be politically uni-
fied. It sometimes dealt with entirely outdated, antiquarian concepts because 
these were of academic interest and part of the newly invented system of 
private law, built on Roman foundations At the same time, concepts could 
be derived also from other traditions, including Natural Law, especially for 
situations where Roman law was unable to provide what was needed for a 
future legal order. The voluminous handbooks and textbooks, produced by 
pandectistic jurists, were of a dogmatic nature, including a general theory 
of law In the second half of the 19th century these books were mostly based 
on the Corpus iuris civilis itself and not so much on (reconstructed) classical 
Roman law8) Although the Dutch professors of Roman law never intended 
to use the Corpus iuris for creating future private law – Roman law was and 
remained abolished in the Netherlands and there was a Civil Code – they saw 
the structures and terminology, developed in Germany, as a useful tool to get 
a grip on the Code and its provisions as in force
As stated above, Goudsmit and Modderman can be considered followers of 
Pandectism. In his inaugural address at Leiden University (1859) Joel Ema-
nuel Goudsmit (1813–1882) phrased his famous statement that we should not 
study Roman law because it is Roman, but because it is law9) He emphasized 
wetenschap van het Burgerlijk Regt in het algemeen […]”, see Bijdragen tot regts­
geleerdheid en wetgeving 12 (1838) 149–156, 149–150
7) See for Goudsmit and Modderman C JH  Ja n se n ,  De wetenschappelijke 
beoefening van het burgerlijk recht in de lange 19e eeuw (= Serie Onderneming en 
recht 87), Deventer 2015, 102–105, 121–122, 174–175, 206–207, 324–325
8) The gap between the academic teaching of Roman law and the demands of legal 
practice was bridged by the compulsory examinations required to be passed by those 
wishing to practise law
9) J.E .  Goud sm it ,  Oratio de studio juris romani hac quoque aetate in patria no­
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that those parts of Roman law deserve our attention which were received in 
our Codes or had appeared to exercise an enduring influence10) Of a rather 
pandectistic nature was also Goudsmit’s Pandecten-systeem. The first vol-
ume was a ‘general part’ (Algemeen Deel), comparable to the Allgemeiner 
Teil, with which German pandectistic textbooks usually started. The second 
volume contained a general doctrine of the law of obligations. The emphasis 
was on Justinianic law in the sense of taking the text of the Corpus iuris as it 
is as a starting point, just as the more practice-oriented lawyers always had 
done Goudsmit did pay some attention to pre-Justinianic law but rejected 
textual criticism which would undermine the authority of Justinianic law 
Goudsmit’s Pandecten-systeem was historical in the sense that it occasional-
ly indicated that pre­Justinianic law was different but a­historical in the sense 
that it presented general dogmatics with which Justinianic or pre-Justinianic 
Roman law had never been familiar11) Yet we know that, although his lec-
tures on the Institutes were an introduction to contemporary private law, in 
his lectures on the Digest Goudsmit dealt with classical law12) Moreover, he 
published scholarly articles on Roman law which were written rather in the 
wake of Legal Humanism13)
In his inaugural address in Groningen (1867) Wiardus Modderman (1838–
1882) pronounced upon the purpose of teaching Roman law, which in his 
opinion consisted primarily in a better understanding of contemporary pri-
vate law14) His manual on Roman law was pandectistic as regards its outline 
and nature, presenting general doctrines, but at the same time it paid attention 
to pre-Justinianic law15) For jurists as Goudsmit and Modderman the value of 
Roman law consisted in the dogmatics which the law of their days was sup-
posed to have derived from Roman law. Private law in force had developed on 
Roman soil, it was argued Roman law, which in their eyes was of an excel-
stra excolendo Leiden 1859, 22: “Juri Romano opera est danda, non quod Romanum, 
sed quod jus est.”
10) Ibid 23
11) J.E .  Goud sm it ,  Pandecten­systeem, I–II, Leiden 1866–1870.
12) A .A.  de  P i n to ,  Levensbericht J.E. Goudsmit, in: Jaarboek 1882, Amsterdam 
1882, 65–97, 67
13) A series ‘Opmerkingen, het Romeinsche regt betreffende’ (Observations con-
cerning Roman law), published from 1857 until 1869 in the Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 
[RM] Themis
14) W  Modde r ma n ,  Het Romeinsche regt en de hedendaagsche regtsgeleerd-
heid, Groningen 1867
15) W  Modde r ma n ,  Handboek voor het Romeinsche recht I, Groningen 1877 
Parts II and III were completed by others and appeared later.
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lent quality and lasting value, was indispensable for elucidating present­day 
law and understanding legal writers Although in their days the Corpus iuris 
was no longer a source of law, they strongly related it to the law as in force
From the time scholars of positive private law started to embrace Pan-
dectism, as did, for example, the Groningen professor Gerhardus Diephuis 
(1817–1892), the teaching of Roman law became less pivotal as a prepara-
tion for getting a grip on positive law. Pandectistic notions such as ‘legal 
act’ (Rechtsgeschäft or rechtshandeling, cf art 1349 of the Oud Burgerlijk 
Wetboek [OBW], ‘contractual capacity’ (Geschäftsfähigkeit or han delings-
bekwaam heid, cf art 1349 OBW) or ‘authority to alienate’ (Verfügungs-
befugnis or beschikkingsbevoegdheid, cf art 667 OBW) were now incor-
porated in the French way of teaching private law Nevertheless, Roman law 
was still seen as an excellent introduction to the system and the principal 
rules of present­day private law. This did not change, when by the end of the 
century the pandectistic way of teaching Roman law had to give way to a 
more historical one, with more attention for classical law
Also, this more historical way of handling the Corpus iuris was seen as a 
useful part of legal education. The Austrian legal historian Paul Koschaker 
(1879–1951) termed it as neo-humanism16). It had its origin in Germany. The 
promulgation in 1900 of the German Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] put an 
end to the usus modernus pandectarum, which had still applied the Corpus 
iuris. Pandectism had achieved its ultimate goal, namely the establishment of 
a system of private law for a unified Germany, based on Roman concepts. At 
this time Roman law scholars started to look for new horizons and took on the 
ideals of Legal Humanism, although still persisting in the legal framework es-
tablished by the pandectists. They expanded the historical component of their 
discipline, now seeking to discover the historical truth in a purely academic 
way and with a strong focus on reconstructing the law of the classical period
A number of Dutch professors followed to some extent the examples, set by 
their German colleagues It has to be noted, however, that the humanist, his-
torical approach to Roman law, as practiced previously by the Dutch Elegant 
School, was never entirely put aside in the Netherlands. The Leiden professor 
Smallenburg, mentioned above, published the commentary of Anton Schult-
ingh (1659–1734) on the Digest, although in his lectures on the Code civil of 
1811 he referred only to contemporary authors17) Willem Matthias D’Ablaing 
16) See P.  Koscha ke r,  Europa und das römische Recht, 41966, 290–311
17) At least relying on his Primae lineae juris civilis Hollandici, in primis secun-
dum codicem Napoleonticum, Leiden 1820
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(1851–1889), also teaching in Leiden, still stuck to the principles of the mos 
gallicus and explicitly rejected those of the new pandectistic trend18). The lat-
ter also holds good for the Utrecht professor Jean Charles Naber (1858–1950), 
who taught Roman law from 1885 until 192719) Naber opposed the extensive 
repertory of concepts construed by the pandectists and dealt with the devel-
opment of law during Roman Antiquity20). Under the influence of the emerg-
ing neo-humanistic trend in Germany from 1900 onwards, Dutch textbooks 
started to focus on the reconstructed law of the classical era, albeit presented 
according to the order of the Codes of civil law. This we find, for example, in 
the books of Isaac Henri Hijmans (1869–1937) of the Municipal University 
of Amsterdam and that of Julius Christiaan van Oven (1881–1963) of Leiden 
University21) Despite their focus on classical law and their historical, neo-hu-
manistic approach, these writers regarded Roman law also as useful for legal 
education since it had produced the main notions and dogmatics of contem-
porary law22) Van Oven greatly compared Roman law with the law in force 
in his own days His textbook on Roman law, written during World War II, 
contained numerous references to provisions in the Dutch Civil Code of 1838
Characteristic of the neo-humanistic teaching of Roman law was also the 
use of primary, case-based materials In Germany, the exegesis of Digest 
texts according to classical law was introduced as an academic exercise Such 
a thing had been promoted already by Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–
1861), who had focussed on classical law He greatly idealized this stage of 
Roman law, since it had been developed within legal scholarship rather than 
being imposed by official authorities23) In the pandectistic teaching of Ro-
man law in the Netherlands, there had been little room for interpreting such 
case-based texts in order to develop more general rules (inductive method) 
However, from the time the teaching of Roman law was more strongly based 
on the neo-humanistic approach, discussing Digest texts, after the example 
of the exegesis in Germany was seen as valuable for future jurists
18) C JH  Ja n se n ,  Wetenschappelijke beoefening (n 7) 173–174
19) His biography and bibliography can be found in JCh   Nabe r,  Observatiun-
culae selectae, edited by JE   Spr u i t ,  Napoli 1995, xvii–liii,
20) C JH  Ja n se n ,  Wetenschappelijke beoefening (n 7) 175–176
21) I H   H ijma n s ,  Romeinsch zakenrecht, Zwolle 1917; idem ,  Romeinsch 
verbintenissenrecht, Zwolle 1918; JC  va n  O ve n ,  Leerboek van Romeinsch 
privaatrecht, Leiden 1945 (first edition)
22) C JH  Ja n se n ,  Wetenschappelijke beoefening (n 7) 221–222, 293
23) See for the influence of Savigny in the Netherlands P.C.  Kop,  Savigny en de 
wetenschap van het privaatrecht in Nederland in de negentiende eeuw, TR 57 (1989) 
117–134
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When we review the various approaches to studying and teaching Ro-
man law from the nineteenth until the middle of the twentieth century, 
our conclusion must be that there was the more ‘pandectistic’ one, which 
emphasized the timeless importance of Roman dogmatics and concepts, 
and the more neo-humanistic one, which sought to understand Roman 
law, especially classical Roman law in its historical context. The former 
was more applicative, ie directed towards present-day law, than contem-
plative, i.e. directed towards distinct historical eras. The latter was more 
contemplative, but still applicative in referring to and comparing with 
contemporary law24) Both approaches were historical in the sense that 
they acknowledged that Roman law developed during Roman Antiquity 
and both were a-historical in describing Roman law in the pandectistic 
framework, reflected in the Codes of civil law. At the same time the for-
mer approach was to a greater extent a-historical by presenting legal dog-
matics and concepts, which had not existed in classical or Justinianic Ro-
man law, whereas the latter was to a greater extent historical by being 
more reluctant in following these generalizations and the Begriffsjurispru-
denz of the pandectists
Both approaches had in common that they regarded the teaching of Ro-
man law as an indispensable introduction to the principles and concepts 
of contemporary private law At the beginning, however, for jurists such 
as Modderman, Roman law simply contained the principles and concepts, 
needed for handling the Code of civil law For later scholars of Roman law, 
this had become less obvious To them, Roman law was a perfect introduc-
tion to the system of contemporary private law. Although we term the first 
approach as ‘pandectistic’, since it provided a pandectistic-dogmatic frame-
work for a non-pandectistic Code of law, it was not and could not have been 
pandectistic in the sense of applying Roman law to legal practice, since 
in the Netherlands the Corpus iuris was no longer a source of law It also 
lacked the pandectistic programme of constructing a legal system for a fu-
ture Code of Civil Law25)
24) For the distinction between application and contemplation see K   Lu ig ,  The 
history of Roman private law and the unification of European law, In: Zeitschrift für 
Europäisches Privatrecht 5 (1997) 405–427, 406–407. I do not use the term applica-
tive here in the sense of actually applying to contemporary law as the pandectists 
would have used the term
25) On the other hand, textbooks on positive private law by scholars who had em-
braced Pandectism did result in a kind of pandectistic ‘interpretatio passiva’ of the 
Burgerlijk Wetboek which is still apparent
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I I I   T he  t each i ng  of  Roma n law i n  t he 
second ha l f  of  t he  20 t h cent u r y
The above provides us with the background for understanding the various 
ways Roman law was and is taught from the second half of the 20th century 
onwards. Three of such ways can be distinguished, viz (i) a ‘pandectistic’ 
school, which uses Roman law materials to elucidate the principles of con-
temporary private law and ignores for the greater part the historical context 
from which these materials originate, (ii) a ‘neo-humanistic’ school, which 
focusses on classical Roman law, thereby merely referring to and compar-
ing with contemporary law, and (iii) a ‘legal historical’ school, which treats 
Roman law as an integral part of the western legal tradition, from which our 
contemporary law developed. As a matter of fact, a specific method of teach-
ing can bear evidence of more than one of these schools, albeit that some 
characteristics exclude each other
( i )  A ‘pa ndec t i s t ic’  school :  Roma n law a s  t he  lega l  sys -
t em we s t i l l  u se:
The present ‘pandectistic’ school originates from a critical attitude towards 
the neo-humanistic approach of Roman law In his inaugural address (1946) 
the Groningen professor HJ Scheltema (1906–1981) criticized the neo-hu-
manistic Romanists who would treat the pre-Justinianic sources unprofes-
sionally. Many of them would not be sufficiently equipped to apply the purely 
historical method to these sources26) Moreover, Scheltema regarded the new 
approach not to be a mere shift of emphasis, but as having replaced the legal 
method by a philological one27). It is questionable whether this black­and­
white image accurately reflected the reality of his days. Scheltema was none-
theless confident that university courses in Roman law should be of a distinct 
dogmatic nature, if they had to be of any value for contemporary jurists 
From the outset he used his own lecture synopses (the famous ‘klappers’) In 
1954, he made his vision on teaching Roman law more explicit in a prelimi-
nary advice He maintained that, if one takes Roman law merely from a his-
torical perspective, it will contain quite a lot of pointless information for fu-
ture jurists. Thereby, he referred to the teaching of Roman law in France, but 
not to any particular practice in the Netherlands or Belgium28) Scheltema’s 
26) H J  Schel t ema ,  De nieuwere critiek op de Romeinsche rechtsbronnen uit 
den tijd voor Justinianus, Groningen 1946, 8
27) Ibid 3 note 1
28) Report of H. J.  Schel t ema in: Prae­adviezen inzake de opleiding van de 
jurist, uitgebracht voor de op 23 Februari 1954 te houden vergadering van het Ge-
RA2020.indb   203 13.05.2020   18:43:07
Jan Hallebeek204
ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFTUNG FÜR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, Roman. Abt. [ZRGR] 137 (2020)
synopses were elaborated and edited in 1984 under the title Mr HJ Schel-
tema’s Inleiding tot het Romeinse recht, which appeared to be a textbook of 
a strong applicative nature29) Roman law was described and explained at an 
elementary level and continuously related to the provisions of the Civil Code 
of 1838 and those of the New Civil Code, which was not yet promulgated 
Oddly enough, the emphasis in the book was still on the reconstructed clas-
sical Roman law (with some references to later Justinianic alterations) and 
not on the law of the Corpus iuris itself By all means ‘pandectistic’ was the 
relatively extensive general law of obligations Although comparison (simi-
larities and differences) held a prominent place in the book, the underlying 
thought was still that Roman law was not randomly chosen to be taught in a 
law faculty, but because it contains the essentials of contemporary law Ap-
parently, Roman law should be seen as a stage in the historical development 
towards our contemporary law, although in Scheltema’s textbook this idea 
got stuck in an embryonic stage
Scheltema was not the only one who criticized teaching Roman law in a 
“too historical” manner. Already in 1948, H.R. Hoetink (1900–1963), pro-
fessor of Roman law at the Municipal University of Amsterdam, had pro-
nounced explicitly upon the teaching of Roman law Although in his own 
scholarly research Hoetink always proceeded in a historical way and also 
investigated the Nachleben of Roman law, he resisted a too historical ap-
proach of Roman law in legal education He considered Roman law, as it was 
usually taught at that time, overly historical, demanding too much special-
ized, non-legal knowledge In his opinion, scholarship of Roman law had 
lost its connection with positive law and offered future practitioners “a stone 
for bread”30)
Scheltema’s successor in Groningen, JHA Lokin (1945), refashioned 
Scheltema’s synopses to create the new textbook Prota. The first edition ap-
peared in 1989 and by now the 10th edition has been published31). The preface 
nootschap (= Pro Excolendo Jure Patrio), Groningen 1954, 19–32, 22. See on the 
teaching of Scheltema also E WA  He n se n  Langs zelf gekozen paden – Het leven 
van H.J. Scheltema, N.E.M. Pareau & Mr. J. Jer. van Nes, Amsterdam 1992, 119–121 
and W J  Zwa lve ,  Teaching Roman law in the Netherlands, In: Zeitschrift für eu-
ropäisches Privatrecht 5 (1997) 393–404.
29) H  J  Schel t ema ,  Inleiding tot het Romeinse recht, Groningen 1984
30) H.R .  Hoe t i n k ,  Rechtswetenschap, in: K .F.  P roos t / J.  Romei n  (eds.), 
Geestelijk Nederland 1920–1940, Deel II, Amsterdam etc 1948, 57–84, 80 The ex-
pression “a stone for bread” refers to Matthew 7.9–11.
31) J.H.A.  L ok i n ,  Prota, Vermogensrechtelijke leerstukken aan de hand van 
Romeinsrechtelijke teksten [1989], Groningen 102016
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of the first edition says the following about the purpose of the Roman materi-
als, presented in the book: ‘The texts should not in the first place bring to life 
the past but the present, and in this specific case even the future. For, they 
are selected in view of illustrating present­day questions of patrimonial law, 
and they are, moreover, discussed in connection with the provisions of the fu-
ture Civil Code Accordingly, Roman law, as explained on the basis of these 
texts, serves as material for comparison with present­day law. Thus, from the 
thousands of texts the Romans demised us, only those were chosen which are 
suitable for such a comparison, irrespective of the time they came into be-
ing’32). As a matter of fact, it can be queried whether contemporary concepts 
can be elucidated by ancient texts and whether these texts may be derived 
from divergent stages of legal development in Roman Antiquity. Scheltema 
had confined himself to an elementary description of the classical Roman law 
of property and obligations and to comparison with present-day law How-
ever, in the book of Lokin it is not always clear which stage of development 
of Roman law is dealt with Either this is only mentioned casually, or, within 
the treatment of one subject, various, successive rules of law are mixed up, 
without observing chronology33). Moreover, in Prota certain Roman concepts 
are connected with contemporary law, while it is beyond doubt that these do 
not constitute the foundation of the present-day concept Most of the time, it 
is neither possible to know for sure whether these may have served as model 
for the latter34) Furthermore, for some present-day procedural rules we can 
find in the Corpus iuris only an initial impetus and, historically, these rules 
cannot possibly be related to the formulary procedure, which was abolished 
32) Ibid p I: “De teksten dienen niet in de eerste plaats het verleden te laten leven 
maar het heden en in dit bijzondere geval zelfs de toekomst Want zij zijn geselecteerd 
om als illustratie te dienen van hedendaagse vermogensrechtelijke vraagstukken en 
worden bovendien besproken in wisselwerking met de bepalingen van het toekom-
stige Burgerlijk Wetboek Het Romeinse recht zoals dat aan de hand van de teksten 
wordt uitgelegd dient dus als vergelijkingsmateriaal van het hedendaagse recht Uit 
de duizenden teksten die de Romeinen ons hebben nagelaten zijn dan ook slechts die 
gekozen die zich voor zulk een vergelijking lenen, ongeacht de periode waarin zij 
zijn ontstaan.”
33) For example, in the paragraph on the creation and extinction of servitudes, 
classical and Justinianic law alternate with each other arbitrarily and without any 
explanation, see L ok i n ,  Prota (n. 31), G61, 177–179.
34) For example, the fiducia which was acknowledged in Dutch case law before 
it was, in 1992, put aside by article 3:84 section 3 of the present-day Civil Code, did 
not derive from the fiducia of classical Roman law, see L ok i n ,  Prota (n. 31), Z23, 
118–120
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long before the days of Justinian Nevertheless, the latter way of civil litiga-
tion is dealt with in Prota35)
Can we still consider Prota to be a legal­historical textbook? Lokin takes 
the affirmative view: ‘And yet the way the texts are interpreted can be called 
historical or preferably legal-historical and this book is indeed a legal-his-
torical book Because the explanation of the old texts according to the pre-
sent day is not something new, but as old as Roman law itself It is a legal 
approach par excellence to extract the written rules of law, which are handed 
down, from the foundation of their creation and after such abstraction to ap-
proach these rules from just one perspective, viz to what extent they may 
serve the solution or explanation of a contemporary problem’36). The ‘legal 
approach par excellence’ reminds one of applying hermeneutics when read-
ing texts from the past, as dealt with in the theories of Hans-Georg Gad-
amer (1900–2002), but Gadamer always emphasized that the hermeneutic 
approach elucidates the distance in time and, as a consequence, shows the 
characteristic features of our own time It does not put Roman provisions on 
a par with present-day provisions ‘Extracting rules of law from the founda-
tion of their creation’ is something legal theorists do, creating a kind of logic 
of legal concepts It is also what the German pandectists had done, but they 
were strongly criticised for this by Rudolf von Jhering (1818–1892) It is not 
entirely clear what Lokin meant when he spoke about the explanation of the 
old texts according to the present day (“de uitlegging van de oude teksten 
naar de eigen tijd”). He probably referred to the value Roman texts still can 
have for contemporary law, which is certainly possible Yet, ascribing to an-
cient texts any value for contemporary law requires more than just pointing 
out similarities It can only be achieved through a process of decontextuali-
sation and resubstantialisation. In order to decontextualize, one should first 
establish the context, ie the circumstances (Bedingtheiten) within which 
the text came into being or was operative Only then it is possible to abstract 
from that context, namely as far as it is incompatible with the present cir-
35) L ok i n ,  Prota (n. 31), P13 and P15, 54–55 and 55–56.
36) Ibid p II: “En toch is de wijze waarop de teksten worden geinterpreteerd wel 
degelijk historisch of liever rechtshistorisch te noemen en is dit boek wel degelijk een 
rechtshistorisch boek Want de uitlegging van de oude teksten naar de eigen tijd toe is 
niet nieuw maar zo oud als het Romeinse recht zelf Het is een bij uitstek juridische 
wijze van benadering de overgeleverde geschreven rechtsregels uit de bedding van 
hun ontstaan te lichten en ze, aldus geabstraheerd, te beschouwen vanuit slechts een 
gezichtshoek, nl in hoeverre zij dienstig kunnen zijn aan de oplossing of de verkla-
ring van een eigentijds vraagstuk.”
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cumstances, and grant the remaining ‘core’ a role in the present-day con-
text37). To put it differently: whoever wishes to establish the intrinsic value of 
an old text for present­day law, should first trace the ‘core’ of the text. But to 
achieve this we need context, and we can only dispose of that context after 
it has been established38)
As a consequence, Prota evokes manifold questions. It does explain con-
temporary private law by means of Roman law texts, but it seems as if the 
scholarly sound way of dealing with historical materials is put aside for di-
dactical purposes39). Can that be justified in an academic setting? Moreover, 
can it be justified to create an amalgam of elements, derived from divergent 
stages of Roman law, which were not at one moment in time or within one 
and the same territory connected to each other or parts of one and the same 
legal system? What remains are isolated historical texts for comparison, but 
for that purpose we can select texts from any legal tradition and the choice 
for Roman law becomes arbitrary
( i i )  A ‘neo -hu ma n is t ic’  school :  Roma n law a s  t he  law 
of  a n  a nc ient  soc ie t y :
A number of other textbooks were and are of a more contemplative na-
ture, based on the neo-humanistic approach with major attention for classi-
cal Roman law, which the authors commonly also observe in their scholarly 
work At the same time these books usually stick to a pandectistic structur-
ing of the materials Moreover, as a concession to the more applicative ap-
proach – after all, the textbooks were written for courses in the law faculties 
– they do contain references to the Code of civil law as in force Examples 
are the Dutch elaboration (1967) of Kaser’s Kurzlehrbuch by FBJ Wubbe 
(1923–2014)40), the book by R Derine (1926–1987), who taught in Louvain 
37) Cf K W  Nör r,  Das römische Recht zwischen Technik und Substanz: Be-
merkungen zu seiner Rolle am Ende des 20 Jahrhunderts, in: Zeitschrift für Eu-
ropäisches Privatrecht 2 (1994) 67–76, 74ff.
38) Furtum in Roman law, for example, is not the same as theft in contemporary 
law, not even when we expand the latter with embezzlement and joyriding Furtum is 
handling a thing as an owner would do but without being entitled That is much more 
extensive than theft and stems from an entirely different social setting than theft as 
it is understood as a crime nowadays The comparison is useful, because it can show 
the defects of theft as a contemporary legal concept Furtum, however, does not say 
anything about present-day theft, which is based on different criteria
39) Cf my review of the book in: Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn [RM] Themis 163 
(2002) 223–226
40) M  K a se r,  Romeins privaatrecht, voor het gebruik aan Nederlandse univer-
siteiten bewerkt door FB J  Wubbe ,  Zwolle 1967 (first edition)
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and Antwerp41), and that of the Utrecht professor JE Spruit (1937)42). The 
concise textbook by JA Ankum (1930–2019), who taught many years at the 
University of Amsterdam, is the only one lacking references to contempo-
rary law43) In general, these books deal with the Roman texts in a scholarly 
sound way. They do not, however, succeed very well in connecting Roman 
law with contemporary law. In the first place they show no or only little legal 
development. They just refer to contemporary law, thereby passing over the 
intervening stages (medieval ius commune, reception of Roman law, codifica-
tion), a phenomenon sometimes termed as salto mortale Secondly, they focus 
on classical law, whereas the Corpus iuris itself constitutes the basis for the 
civilian tradition of the European continent
( i i i )  A d i spute  be t ween t he  ‘pa ndec t i s t ic’  a nd  t he  neo -
hu ma n is t ic  school  (1992–1993):
In 1992 the Leiden professor WJ Zwalve (1949) declared himself openly 
against the ‘neo-humanistic’ approach in the compulsory courses at the law 
faculties He did so in front of an international audience of Romanists, who 
for the greater part were teaching and researching on the basis of the neo-
humanistic principles which Zwalve contested, viz at the annual conference 
of the Société Internationale ‘Fernand de Visscher’ pour l’Histoire des Droits 
de l’ Antiquité, which took place that year in Amsterdam44) His paper evoked 
inter alia a strong reaction from Ankum Both views were put to words again 
in concise papers, published one year afterwards in the journal Ars Aequi45)
In the wake of Scheltema, Zwalve made an issue of the antithesis between 
the historical and legal approach towards Roman law Without describing 
what these two exactly entail, he suggested they exclude each other He char-
acterized the legal approach as following the method of Alberico Gentili 
(1552–1608) and the pandectists, which remark brought about a confusion 
of tongues After all, Gentili and the pandectists had written about Roman 
law as living law, whereas in 1992 Roman law as a source of law had been 
41) R   De r i ne ,  Schets van het Romeins privaatrecht, Uitwendige en inwendige 
rechtsgeschiedenis, Antwerp 1982
42) JE   Spr u i t ,  Cunabula iuris, Elementen van het Romeins privaatrecht, De-
venter 22003
43) JA   A n k u m ,  Elementen van Romeins recht, Zwolle 1976
44) Previously W. J.  Zwa lve  had already expounded his view on teaching legal 
history and his objections against the ‘neo-humanistic’ approach, see his Het Janus-
hoofd der Rechtsvergelijking, Groningen 1988
45) W. J.  Zwa lve ,  De toekomst van het Romeinse recht, in: Ars aequi 42 (1993) 
455–459; J.A .  A n k u m ,  Stenen voor brood, in: Ars aequi 42 (1993) 459–463.
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abolished for a long time Accordingly, Ankum replied that a return to the 
pandectistic method is impossible Whoever maintains something else is giv-
ing his students ‘a stone for bread’, he argued Here Ankum used the same ex-
pression as Hoetink had done in 1948, when objecting against a neo-human-
istic teaching of Roman law Zwalve stated that the Dutch Romanists of the 
19th century had emphasized Roman law as living law, but that could not be 
correct, since Roman law had lost its validity before that time What Zwalve 
probably meant to say here was that these Romanists emphasized the contin-
ued effect of Roman law in the civil law of their own days. The legal approach 
Zwalve had in mind when talking about the pandectists must be something 
like teaching Roman law with particular attention for the substantive and 
procedural norms of present-day law and always in comparison with that law
And what made the historical approach so historical? Was it the fact that 
it kept in mind the specific stage of legal development from which a specific 
Roman law text derived? Scheltema had done exactly the same in his post-
humously edited textbook. The historical approach had to be something like 
emphasizing the original historical context of the Roman texts But ‘histori-
cal’ and ‘legal’ are not opposites and certainly do not exclude each other All 
available textbooks in the 1990s, except Prota, were in fact both historical 
and legal. There were differences in emphasis and sometimes even consider-
able differences, but that is something else.
Basically, Zwalve and Ankum agreed in many respects Both acknowl-
edged the value of Roman law as a tool for a better understanding of contem-
porary private law Both acknowledged the value of Roman law for showing 
that law has developed historically Ankum explicitly referred to the latter 
purpose of teaching Roman law, although one could argue that the neo-hu-
manistic school can also be said to be fixated on a flat surface, albeit this 
time that of classical Roman law In Zwalve’s paper this aim of teaching 
Roman law remained neglected but was still present Without reference to 
any source, he quoted Joan Melchior Kemper (1776–1824) and by doing so 
he endorsed the latter’s statement that Roman law should make the student 
familiar with ‘the fundamental pillars on which are raised until now all the 
more recent systems of legislation’ (“de grondzuilen waarop tot nu toe al de 
nieuwere stelsels van wetgeving zijn opgehaald”) and make him/her aware 
of ‘the roots of most of the provisions of the new law’ (“de oorzaken der 
meeste vaststellingen van het nieuwe regt”)46) Moreover, if Roman law had 
46) Verhandelingen, redevoeringen en staatkundige geschriften van Jhr Joa n 
Melch ior  Kempe r,  ed J  de  Bosch  Kempe r,  vol I, Amsterdam 1834, 343 
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not played any role in the historical development of our system of private law, 
how would it be capable of providing the student insight into this system?
In the dispute between Zwalve and Ankum concerning the best way of 
teaching Roman law, more may have been at stake than just the things they 
adduced in their papers Exegesis of Digest texts, for example, was a major 
element in teaching Roman law according to the neo-humanistic approach, 
whereas the ‘pandectistic’ approach tended towards a purely dogmatic and 
doctrinal programme, rendering the exercise in analysing primary texts of a 
case-based nature redundant or anyhow less necessary Judging by the two 
papers, we can say that the entire dispute between Zwalve and Ankum in fact 
boiled down to two questions: (i) to what extent should contemporary law be 
incorporated in teaching Roman law? and (ii) which stage of development of 
Roman law should hold a prominent place?
As regards the first question, it is remarkable that Zwalve waged war 
against Roman law as a ‘mere historical discipline’, since, in fact, it was 
nowhere taught in such a way In all textbooks and university courses of the 
time there was attention for contemporary law, such as in the frequently used 
textbook by the Leiden professor Robert Feenstra (1920–2013), of which the 
first edition had appeared in 197347) It is true that in the book of Scheltema 
comparison with contemporary law took a more prominent position by refer-
ring to similarities and differences, but the claim that this was lacking in the 
other books is untenable It may be noted here, incidentally, that attention 
to contemporary law when teaching Roman law is by all means justified. In 
legal education we should not avoid positive law and the great value of Ro-
man law consists in the fact that it can teach us to put contemporary law into 
perspective, which goal can be reached through comparison Even in a mere 
historical approach towards Roman law texts, sound hermeneutics require 
that we are aware of the present-day reality, for if we are, we will be better 
aware of our own premises and preconceptions
As regards the second question, Zwalve argued in favour of teaching Ro-
man law on the basis of the Corpus iuris itself or the ius commune and not 
on the basis of classical law48) He suggested, somewhat exaggeratedly, that 
classical law is rather the product of modern conjectures Following Schel-
tema, but without referring to him, he spoke about ‘philological dilettantism’ 
It may be that here already Zwalve had the historical-comparative method in mind, 
which he would follow in his own textbook on the law of property
47) R   Fee n s t r a ,  Romeinsrechtelijke grondslagen van het Nederlands privaat-
recht, Inleidende hoofdstukken, Leiden 61994
48) At the end of his paper, however, he opened the door again for classical law
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within Roman law scholarship49) In this way he did no justice, as Ankum 
rightfully observed, to the Romanists of his time Scheltema had spoken in 
1946, not in 1992, and in the meantime post-war scholarship had overcome 
the unrestricted chase after interpolations Moreover, Zwalve ignored the fact 
that change was on its way. The textbook of Feenstra, mentioned above, and 
a series of smaller exercise books (see below) paid considerably more atten-
tion to the ius commune
Ankum maintained that choosing a certain stage of development (classical 
law, Justinianic law, ius commune) for teaching Roman law is a matter of ef-
ficiency. In so doing he ignored the arguments adduced by Zwalve. Further, 
Ankum’s preference to consistently stick to classical Roman law, is not con-
vincing. The suggestion to base the teaching of Roman law on the Corpus 
iuris or the ius commune is entirely plausible I fully endorse Zwalve’s argu-
ments and will add some more below. As regards the question in which way 
Roman law as a legal discipline should be taught, Zwalve remained vague 
He spoke about emphasis on private law in force and systematic comparison 
with the law of European countries of major importance. Presumably he had 
his own textbook in mind, in which he had adopted such an approach
This textbook on the law of property, Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis 
van het Europese privaatrecht (part I), appeared that very year (1993) It was 
not intended for a compulsory introductory course in Roman law, but for a 
more advanced optional course of ‘comparative private law’50) Accordingly, 
the approach could be and indeed was less ‘pandectisic’ and more ‘historical’ 
In the book there is certainly more attention for legal development, although 
the latter is sometimes still subordinated to private law dogmatics. There is a 
strong emphasis on early modern jurists as Arnold Vinnius (1588–1657) and 
only little attention for the medieval foundations these authors were building 
on, such as the Gloss and the works of Bartolus (1313–1357). There is also 
attention for the legal pluralism of the Middle Ages and the interaction with 
other legal traditions, such as customary law of a Germanic origin
In this textbook, Zwalve followed what he called the ‘comparative-histori-
cal method’ ie researching the historical development of legal concepts and 
rules in comparison with the major continental systems of law. One can ques-
tion, however, whether the texts from primary sources are always sufficiently 
contextualized in order to be subsequently decontextualized (see above). It 
49) Schel t ema ,  De nieuwere critiek (n 26) 8
50) See the introduction in the first edition: W J  Zwa lve ,  Hoofdstukken uit de 
geschiedenis van het Europese privaatrecht, I: Inleiding en zakenrecht, Deventer 
11993, VII
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seems as if all cited learned jurists ie from the glossators until the end of 
the 18th century, were participating in one and the same debate51) On an 
abstract level, later jurists may indeed have pronounced upon the doctrines 
of earlier jurists. This could happen, since the Corpus iuris civilis was their 
common and continuous paradigm for hundreds of years It can be tempting 
to include many authors, past and present, in a theoretical present-day debate 
Nevertheless, every statement has its own historical context, determining its 
exact meaning Without observing this context, it is impossible to position 
the materials in a historical development Furthermore, in view of the fact 
that Zwalve had previously pled for taking Justinianic law as a starting point, 
had qualified classical law as ‘the result of modern conjectures’ and, when 
discussing the purpose of his book, maintained that the neo-humanistic ap-
proach renders Roman law superfluous for legal education52), it is surprising 
that he repeatedly suggested that classical Roman law, eg the doctrine of 
the classical jurist Paul on the transfer of possession, had influenced the ius 
commune53) The jurists, standing in the tradition of Bartolism and the mos 
italicus, never read distinct opinions of individual Roman jurists in the Cor-
pus iuris, let alone that it first has to be shown that the Digest texts referred 
to, edited in the sixth century, accurately reflected the opinion of Paul who 
lived at the beginning of the third century In a similar way, it remains pe-
culiar which role the Institutes of Gaius, only discovered in 1816, could have 
played in the civilian tradition of the Middle Ages and the early modern era 
It was the humanist jurists, and not the practice-oriented jurists of Bartolism 
and the mos italicus, who had studied the Epitome Gai, handed down through 
the Lex Romana Visigothorum It was typical of the Dutch Elegant School, 
51) This is reminiscent of a category of literature, popular in the 18th century, 
in which deceased celebrities in the next world are discussing the present, such as 
the series Maandelyksche berichten uit de andere waerelt, of de spreekende dooden 
bestaande in redeneeringen tussen allerhande verstorvene potentaten en personagien 
van rang, zo van den deegen, tabbaart, letteren, als anders Similarly, the Frenchman 
Charles Dumoulin (1500–1566) is said to have entered into a debate with the Italian 
Azo († 1230) and the Dutchman Cornelis van Bijnkershoek (1673–1743) with Dumou-
lin and Azo; cf F  Br a nd sma ,  Gemeen recht in Groningen, Enige opmerkingen 
over de matiging van bedongen boetes door de rechter, Groningen 2000, 24
52) According to the Dutch phrasing of this statement, the Romanists had stained 
(“bevlekt”) themselves with the stigma of redundancy; see Zwa lve ,  Hoofdstukken 
(n 50) 11993, 52, 32006, 70 The German edition reads “mit dem Stigma […] gezeich-
net”, see W. J.  Zwa lve /A. J.B.  Si rk s ,  Grundzüge der europäischen Privatrechts-
geschichte, Einführung und Sachenrecht, Vienna 2012, 91
53) See Zwa lve ,  Hoofdstukken (n 50) 32006, 112–120
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and not of the Old Authorities of Roman-Dutch law, to attempt to reconstruct 
on the basis of Digest texts the Gaius’ Institutiones, as did Schultingh in his 
“Jurisprudentia vetus ante­Justinianea”54) Accordingly, it is impossible to 
refer to the Institutes of Gaius when discussing the ius commune-tradition55) 
Notwithstanding this criticism, Zwalve’s textbook was a great step forward 
towards a more historical approach to the development of private law and an 
impressive achievement Its success in academic teaching is well-deserved
It is remarkable that outside the Netherlands the opposing schools ie the 
mere historical, contemplative school, on the one side, and the ‘pandectistic’, 
applicative one, on the other, were at the time strongly involved in a discourse 
concerning the question whether Roman law and legal history can actively 
contribute to a future unified European private law (see also below)56) At 
the European level a change of paradigm had taken place Legal history had 
fallen under the spell of Europeanization and internationalization and was 
no longer directed at discovering the roots of national law Accordingly, legal 
historians and Romanists were facing new questions and new challenges57) 
In the dispute between Zwalve and Ankum, however, there were hardly any 
traces of this burning issue In Zwalve’s Hoofdstukken, on the other hand, 
there are clear traces of Europeanization, given the copious and fruitful com-
parison with French and German law
(iv)  A ‘lega l  h i s tor ica l’  school :  Roma n law a s  pa r t  of  t he 
cont i nent a l  lega l  t r a d i t ion:
However, in the meantime the entire debate was superseded by the emer-
gence of an alternative approach For a long period, the faculties held separate 
chairs for Roman law and history of indigenous law (Oud-Vaderlands recht) 
Nonetheless, it was now increasingly acknowledged that such a distinction 
was artificial, and that Roman law had been an organic part of the legal devel-
54) The Gaius Augustodunensis was only discovered in 1898
55) There are fourteen references to or quotations from the Institutes of Gaius, 
which in the index of sources are positioned under the heading ius commune, see 
Zwa lve ,  Hoofdstukken (n 50) 32006, 577 In the German edition only six references 
were adopted and now under the heading “sonstiges römisches Recht”, see Zwa lve /
Si rk s  (n 52) 522
56) The idea was endorsed by Lokin, see JHA  L ok i n ,  Redactionele kantteke-
ning, Het pit en de kern, in: RM Themis 153 (1992) 305–307
57) F J  A nd ré s  Sa ntos ,  Was erwartet sich die Geschichte des Europäischen 
Privatrechts von der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft?, in: C.  Ba ldu s / P.­ C.  Mü l -
le r- G r a f f  (eds), Die Generalklausel im Europäischen Privatrecht, 2006, 93–114, 
95–106
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opment which resulted in contemporary law58) In order to make this visible, 
the connecting links between the Corpus iuris and the law as in force had to 
be revealed It was LJ van Apeldoorn (1886–1979), professor of legal history 
at the Municipal University of Amsterdam, who, in his textbook “Inleiding 
tot de studie van het Nederlandsche recht”, when describing the principles of 
the Dutch legal system of his days, incorporated Roman law, ius commune, 
early modern continental legal doctrine and practice, and French and Ger-
man legal scholarship of the nineteenth century59) It was Hoetink who in 
his inaugural address at the same university (1935) argued in favour of more 
attention for the medieval interpretation of Roman law and its reception He 
criticized the primarily historical approach towards Roman law, with its em-
phasis on classical law, and suggested that the sources of Roman law should 
be investigated not only from the perspective of classical law, but also had to 
be connected with legal scholarship of the Middle Ages and later periods60)
Gradually, the idea won ground that it was scholastically questionable to 
present classical Roman law as the precursor of contemporary law (the sal-
to mortale­approach). The Leiden professor Robert Feenstra, who had first 
studied under van Apeldoorn and later under Hoetink, frequently urged his 
students to trace the historical development of a concept of law or a legal 
rule by departing from contemporary law and looking back into the past to 
see which precursors could be discerned: the step by step going back to the 
origin of a certain institution
In this search into the past we will many times encounter Roman law, 
but we cannot escape from its medieval or early modern manifestations As 
was explained above, Dutch law and specifically the Burgerlijk Wetboek of 
1838 had its roots in early modern law, building again to some extent on the 
tradition of Bartolism Although the present-day Burgerlijk Wetboek (1992) 
is of a more pandectistic nature than the previous one, there is nevertheless 
a considerable continuity in the transition of private law under the previous 
code to that under the present­day code. This implies that, when searching 
the past, it is impossible for Dutch private law to bypass the entire ius com-
mune period in order to end up in the Roman law of Antiquity. That would 
58) This acknowledgment was unfortunately frequently used by university policy-
makers to economise through fusing the chairs of Roman law and indigenous legal 
history
59) L  J  va n  Apeldoor n ,  Inleiding tot de studie van het Nederlandsche recht, 
first edition Zwolle 1933, 13th edition Zwolle 1955
60) Hoetink’s address delivered on 28 January 1935; HR   Hoe t i n k ,  De achter-
grond van het Romeinse recht, Haarlem 1935
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be a salto mortale backwards. This may be different for German law because 
the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch of 1900 came into existence out of a hypertro-
phied systematization of ‘classical’ Roman law by the pandectists, with only 
minor influence of indigenous Germanic law; although it can also be argued 
that the writings of the usus modernus-scholars to some extent must have 
influenced the pandectists.
Through such a retrograde method, which uncovers gradually each stage 
of development, we will trace the genesis of a legal concept or rule through 
time However, in each stage, one and the same Roman text will have its own 
context, determining its purport Since, there has never been a uniform use of 
Roman law within the tradition of ius commune, but a continuously evolving 
interpretation depending on changing circumstances, there is no such a thing 
as one interpretation of a Roman law text. There are many interpretations61) 
Moreover, we will also see that Roman law doctrine is commonly not the 
only origin of a certain rule of law Legal concepts or one or more of their el-
ements may go back to indigenous customary law, canon law, feudal law, the 
lex mercatoria, Natural Law­theories, etc. Frequently, the genesis of a legal 
rule or concept is a complicated process, not simply a matter of reception or 
legal transplant; it can be based on many traditions and influenced by many 
circumstances. This reality unsettles the ‘pandectistic’ idea that Roman law 
is essentially the legal system we still use
The retrograde method often resulted in a kind of history of legal dog-
matics, in German termed Dogmengeschichte ie a historical-comparative 
study of private law concepts, with sometimes more and sometimes less at-
tention for the other pillars of contemporary law62) It can, at least partly, 
explain why contemporary law is as it is Some scholars, such as the com-
paratist and legal historian Reinhard Zimmermann, maintained that the ius 
commune, as it was now mapped out by Dogmengeschichte, could contrib-
ute to a future, unified European private law by tracing the origins of the 
various differences between the national codes of private law and in this 
way, through clarifying the context, opening a way to harmonization63). The 
61) Cf R   Fee n s t r a ,  Interpretatio multiplex, Een beschouwing over de zoge-
naamde crisis van het Romeinsche recht, Zwolle 1953 Cf for a similar approach 
to Byzantine law texts, contained in the Basilica, H  de  Jong ,  Using the Basilica, 
ZRG RA 133 (2016) 286–321
62) See about this method C JH  Ja n se n ,  Wetenschappelijke beoefening (n 7) 
141–142 The author suggests that also Scheltema adhered to this approach, but this 
can be questioned.
63) His opus magnus was R   Z i m me r ma n n ,  The law of obligations, Roman 
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harmonized private law of Europe could be built on a renewed usus mo-
dernus pandectarum64) In such a way, Dogmengeschichte had an applica-
tive nature and was sometimes labelled as neo-pandectistic However, in the 
90s Dogmengeschichte also evoked strong criticism from scholars adopting 
the more contemplative approach Especially legal historians from the Max 
Planck­Institute for European Legal History at Frankfurt am Main, which 
after the retirement in 1980 of its director Helmut Coing (1912–2000) adopt-
ed a new line of investigation, rejecting the ideas of Zimmermann More-
over, some of them criticized Dogmengeschichte as such. They spoke about 
a 19th century fusion (Vermischung) of legal history and legal dogmatics 
and made clear that what may seem to be the rebirth of a legal institution 
from the past, can actually be something entirely different, serving an in-
comparable purpose65). Pursuing Dogmengeschichte became for many years 
a scholarly-charged occupation
One of the dangers of the retrograde method, resulting in Dogmenge-
schichte, consists in neglecting the socio-legal context of each separate link 
in the historical chain Not only does such a context determine the precise 
purport of the individual link, it also determines its function in legal practice 
If we want to investigate, for example, the historical development of protec-
tion of possession and take contemporary Dutch law as a starting point, we 
will find that possession is nowadays protected by a delictual (tort) remedy 
(Article 6:162 BW) and only in exceptional cases by a possessory remedy 
(Article 3:125 BW) However, in a retrograde investigation we cannot re-
strict ourselves to protection of possession within the law of obligations, 
since in the past protection through possessory remedies, which eventually 
can be linked to the interdicts of Roman law doctrine, was dominant. Thus, 
the focus should be on a specific factual problem (what can be done against 
infringement of possession?) and not on the legal concept (a single, specific 
remedy, either petitory or possessory) In Dutch law, the only reason the de-
lictual remedy can be used much more frequently is because it has acquired 
foundations of the civilian tradition, Cape Town 1990, which describes the dogmat-
ics of the law of obligations from the Roman law of Antiquity until the present­day 
Codes of Law
64) R   Z i m me r ma n n ,  Das römisch-kanonische ius commune als Grundlage eu-
ropäischer Rechtseinheit, in: Juristenzeitung 47 (1992) 8–20 See also criticism of 
Osler who questions whether something like European legal history actually exists: 
D Osle r,  The myth of a European legal history, in: Rechtshistorisches Journal 16 
(1997) 393–410
65) See the contributions of Küble r,  Si mon a nd  Stol le i s  in Arena, Rechts-
historisches Journal 12 (1993) 259–345, 310–311 and 324
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a rather wide range of application, wider, for example, than in German law 
Similarly, the purpose and function of one and the same legal institution 
may have changed dramatically through the ages Community of property 
as the common arrangement when entering into matrimony was introduced 
in the Netherlands in the Civil Code of 1838. The Utrecht solicitor Chris-
tiaan Lodewijk Schuller tot Peursum (1813–1860), when in 1841 commenting 
upon this Code, described this community as an expression of the unify-
ing bond between spouses: Since spouses are just one flesh, and their souls 
‘passionately merged together, linked to each other and connected’, there 
should neither be any distinction between them as regards the ownership of 
things66) Before that time marital community of all property was not gener-
ally the case. Going back to the times of the Dutch Republic, we find it in 
all  Provinces and territories except Friesland, Groningen and Limburg67) 
However, the institution in Roman-Dutch law had little or nothing to do with 
‘being one flesh’, but rather with preventing merchants from escaping liabil-
ity or accountability Community of property was construed as a contract of 
partnership (societas) and was favourable to creditors in commerce; and it 
should not surprise us, that it can also be traced back to an important trad-
ing city such as Hamburg68) In short, when applying a retrograde method, 
one should always be aware of the fact that in the past the function of legal 
concepts may be different and that previously other legal institutions and con-
cepts may have served the same or comparable purposes Accordingly, not 
the legal institution or dogma should serve as the connecting factor through 
the ages, but the problem or comparable problem it intends to solve Only 
when Dogmengeschichte carefully observes the functionality of legal con-
cepts, can we come to grips with the historical development of law Accord-
ingly, our retrograde method should always be of a genetic-functional nature
The retrograde method and the desire to trace the historical development 
of law also found their way into the academic teaching of Roman law and 
legal history In the Netherlands, there was a growing awareness that for 
66) CL   Schü l le r,  De Nederlandsche wetboeken met aantekeningen, I: Burger-
lijk Wetboek, Utrecht 1841, 41: “Gemeenschap: omdat, gelijk de echtgenooten slechts 
één vleesch zijn en hunne zielen ‘gloênde aanééngesmeed en vastgeschakeld en ver-
bonden’, zoo ook geen onderscheid in den eigendom der goederen tusschen hen be-
hoort te zijn.ˮ
67) H   Nie n hu i s ,  Akademische voorlezingen over het Nederlandsch Burgerlijk 
Regt, 11, Groningen 1849, 403ff
68) Hugo de  G root ,  Inleidinghe II118; for Hamburg see J  Gold feld ,  Ueber 
das Hamburgische Eheliche Güterrecht, Hamburg 1888
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elucidating the foundations of contemporary law, we cannot limit ourselves 
to describing classical Roman law and merely refer to the provisions of 
the Civil Code as in force. In 1973, Feenstra published the first edition 
of his excellent textbook on Roman law, mentioned above, which outlined 
the strong historical relationship between Roman law, on the one hand, 
and contemporary law, on the other, by discussing selected issues also in 
the context of ius commune as well as the era when private law was codi-
fied69) Compared to the textbook of Scheltema, it showed much more legal 
development through the ages, but was less detailed in comparing clas-
sical Roman law with contemporary law (Civil Code, case law and New 
Civil Code) Also, the Hoofdstukken uit de geschiedenis van het Europese 
privaatrecht by Zwalve, mentioned above, dealing with (parts of) the law 
of property, emphasized the legal development of private law within a Eu-
ropean context. For various narrower fields of private law, less extensive 
textbooks were composed, revealing the historical development through 
the centuries70) As a concession to the educational purpose of these issues, 
legal development was commonly restricted to the civilian tradition Al-
though the retrograde method renders the study of classical law almost re-
dundant (see below), the vast majority of these textbooks still discussed it 
extensively. The reason for this may have been, that the authors still sought 
alliance with the traditional teaching of Roman law, inspired by the neo-
humanistic school
69) A textbook following a similar pattern is L L  JM  Wa el ke n s ,  Causa ci-
vium, Handboek Romeins recht, Leuven 32014, also published in English translation 
under the title Amne adverso, Leuven 2015 I will not comment on the Belgian text-
books which treat the history of private law usually in a historical, but rather concise 
way, such as D.  He i rbau t ,  Privaatrechtsgeschiedenis van de Romeinen tot heden, 
Ghent 32013, and D.  De Ruyssche r,  Westers recht in ontwikkeling, Privaat­ en 
publiekrecht van Rome tot vandaag, Mechelen 2011 The textbook by Bart Wauters 
only deals with external legal history; see B  Waut e r s / M  de  Be n i t o ,  The history 
of law in Europa, An introduction, Cheltenham/Northampton 2017
70) See the series ‘Rechtshistorische cahiers’ published from 1979: No 1 (proper-
ty) by GC J J  va n  de n  Be rg h ;  No 2 (contract) by R   Fee n s t r a ;  No 6 (delict) 
by R   Fee n s t r a  (later elaborated by L C  Wi n kel); and No 7 (sale breaks hire) by 
E  JH  Sch r age;  see also the series ‘Juridische reeks, Vrije Universiteit’ published 
from 1986: No 9 (unjust enrichment) by J  Ha l lebeek / E  JH  Sch r age;  No 12 
(transfer of ownership) by JH  Dondor p / E  JH  Sch r age;  and No 15 (delict) 
by JH  Dondor p;  see also E  JH  Sch r age ,  Van delict tot onrechtmatige daad 
(= Ars Aequi cahiers, Rechtsvergelijking en rechtsgeschiedenis’ 42), Nijmegen 1998.
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I V.  P rem ises  for  t each i ng  Roma n law
Given the state of teaching Roman law and legal history in the Netherlands 
by the end of the twentieth century, we can formulate a number of premises, 
which in my opinion should underlie, in the near future, both the teaching of 
these subjects and the corresponding textbooks
( i )  A n appl ica t ive  approach:
In a law-school, the teaching of legal history should be of an applicative 
nature, albeit not in the literary, pandectistic sense of applying Roman law 
to the present or future society, but in the sense of ‘related to positive law’ 
It would be inconceivable if scholars, employed in a faculty of law and edu-
cating future lawyers, would fully withdraw from positive law. Their teach-
ing should provide their students with an intellectual bonus As was shown 
above, we can discern two purposes of teaching Roman law to future law-
yers, viz elucidating the system of contemporary private law, and, secondly, 
showing how law develops through time In recent decades the latter purpose 
has gained importance. The Dutch Civil Code of 1992 is further removed 
from the Corpus iuris than its predecessor was Moreover, compared to the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, we are nowadays inclined to adapt 
the law whenever that is regarded as desirable, which makes it all the more 
relevant to impart to students the awareness that, as time goes on, law is 
always changing Teaching dogmatics, particularly the distinction and inter-
relation between the law of property and the law of obligations, is not easy 
to realize within a short period of seven weeks, which is nowadays the usual 
duration of a Dutch law course71) Legal development, on the other hand, 
can be shown in such a course on the basis of historic materials related to a 
certain question or a certain case72) Suitable materials for such a course can 
be traced by applying a retrograde method If this leads to a certain sedes 
materiae in the Corpus iuris, the same texts can be contextualized various 
times, eg in the Corpus iuris itself, in the Gloss, in Roman-Dutch law, etc 
Subsequently, they can be decontextualized (what is the hard core abstracted 
from the context?) and resubstantialized (which elements of this hard core are 
71) I leave aside here the didactical problem whether such a short period of teach-
ing is compatible with the academic character of education in a certain field It cer-
tainly does not offer much time for in-depth reflection
72) I fully endorse the view that a Roman law course can perfectly serve as an 
introduction to national and international private law, but such a course will require 
more time than just seven weeks Cf also JM  Sche r ma ie r,  Römisches Recht für 
Juristen?, Index 39 (2011) 78–89
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relevant for the next step in legal development?) By so doing, the dynamic 
character of law can be shown, as well as the historic formation of contem-
porary law. Moreover, this method leads to critical reflection and profound 
insight into positive law, which is an essential value in academic legal edu-
cation Courses and textbooks, based on this kind of research, are applica-
tive in their connecting historical materials to the law of today At the same 
time, they are contemplative in the contextual approach towards the various 
links in the development process A retrograde method for selecting materi-
als (searching the genetic-functional links from the present into the past) does 
not exclude the possibility of presenting these materials in a chronological 
order (from the past to the present)
( i i )  A con nec t ion  be t ween re sea rch  a nd  t each i ng:
University policymakers commonly emphasize the coherence which ide-
ally exists between scholarly investigation and academic teaching: the old 
Humboldtian ideal When lecturing, scholars cannot and should not dissoci-
ate themselves from their research activities On the contrary, it is their task 
par excellence to introduce students into their discipline, which includes the 
transfer of both knowledge and research skills. They should allow and enable 
their students to get an inside view of what scholarly investigation entails, 
such as the application of hermeneutics to primary legal sources According-
ly, academic research should to a great extent be determinative for academic 
education. This is exactly what happens when the teaching of legal history is 
based on a retrograde method and on an approach towards Roman law as an 
integral part of the continental legal tradition In so doing, a greater distance 
in time will also have the educational advantage of making more elements of 
the research method explicit and easier to understand
The practitioners of today’s ‘pandectistic’ teaching usually display a cer-
tain dualism. Their research is often historical, whereas their teaching is a­
historical In their research they approach the primary materials in a schol-
arly sound way, whereas in their teaching they subordinate this approach 
to didactical purposes Accordingly, the coherence between research and 
teaching will go astray. Moreover, it can be queried whether in an academic 
setting it is permissible to evoke an image of Roman law texts which is not in 
conformity with the scholarly understanding of these texts It would be like 
pretending the Civil Code of 1811 or that of 1838 had automobiles in mind, 
for example, when dealing with traffic. When we do this, we do not take our 
students seriously as future jurists and scholars; we underestimate their in-
tellectual capacities, and deliberately put them on the wrong track Because 
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‘pandectistic’ textbooks are nevertheless presented as historical, it can hap-
pen that young scholars, even in their dissertations, refer to these books or 
adopt their a-historical approach73)
( i i i )  T he  c iv i l ia n  t r a d i t ion  i s  not  t he  on ly  one:
The genetic­functional retrograde search for legal development as a method 
of legal historical investigation requires an entirely different kind of dealing 
with the sources of Roman law than usually adopted in the ‘pandectistic’ or 
neo-humanist tradition Roman law is no longer the independent system of 
law which we can consider as the precursor of present-day private law; neither 
is Roman law just the law of an ancient society From the retrograde perspec-
tive, it would be entirely arbitrary to take just Roman law – no matter whether 
this is classical or Justinianic Roman law – as the starting point in the past 
of a development which ends in the present Rarely, if ever will a retrograde 
search lead to only the Corpus iuris civilis. The nineteenth century process of 
codifying law was complicated and the process of reception of Roman law in 
the early modern time even more complicated. The way back will lead us to a 
world of legal pluralism Early modern law was characterized by hybridity, an 
amalgamation of various unlike elements, originating from a plurality of legal 
bodies (Roman law, canon law, indigenous customary law, lex mercatoria)74) 
and was shaped by intellectual movements which were determinative for legal 
thinking, such as those of Early Modern Scholasticism and Natural law75) As 
a consequence, textbooks on Roman law have to give way to textbooks on 
legal history, which surely will discuss the Roman roots of present-day law, 
but always in a dialectical correlation with other legal traditions
( iv)  T he re  i s  no  c iv i l ia n  t r a d i t ion  p r ior  t o  t he  g lossa tor s:
The Roman law which the retrograde search eventually will lead us to is 
that of the Middle Ages and not that of classical Antiquity. Zwalve rightly 
73) JE   Ja n se n ,  Bezit te kwader trouw, verkrijgende en bevrijdende verjaring, 
Een leerstellige rechtsvergelijkende studie op historische grondslag, Den Haag 2011, 
31, 33 and 34; see also the review of this dissertation by Si rk s  in: RM Themis 173 
(2012/2) 100–103
74) See the excellent introduction in S .P.  Don la n / D.  Hei rbau t  (eds.), The 
Law’s Many Bodies, Studies in Legal Hybridity and Jurisdictional Complexity, c 
1600–1900, Berlin 2015
75) For the influence of moral theology on the law of obligations see W  De -
cock ,  Theologians and contract law, The moral transformation of the ius commune 
(ca. 1500–1650), Leiden 2013, and N.  Ja n se n ,  Theologie, Philosophie und Juris-
prudenz in der spätscholastischen Lehre von der Restitution, Außervertragliche Aus-
gleichsansprüche im frühneuzeitlichen Naturrechtsdiskurs, Tübingen 2013
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suggested to teach Roman law on the basis of Justinianic law and not on the 
basis of reconstructed classical law76). There are also sound reasons to end 
our retrograde search in Justinianic law as it was understood by the early 
glossators77) Medieval legal scholarship adopted the Corpus iuris civilis as 
a coherent work It was a code of law, promulgated by one and the same leg-
islator It is true that also in the sixth century, when the various parts of the 
Corpus iuris received force of law, they were seen as parts of a consistent 
legislation, expressing the will of the legislator (Justinian) But in Western 
Europe the Corpus iuris civilis had no chance to function as such, at least not 
for a considerable period From the time a law school emerged at Bologna, 
the Corpus iuris civilis was adopted as a consistent code of law, although the 
glossators were well aware how it had come into being. They knew when the 
jurists mentioned in the Digest had lived and they knew when the emperors 
had reigned when mentioned in the Codex Moreover, they had also a his-
torical understanding of the Corpus iuris, in the sense that they realised that 
some provisions were outdated Nevertheless, for them the Corpus iuris was 
as Justinian had intended it to be: a code of law, of which the provisions had 
equal validity and derived their meaning from the position within a specific 
title and from their coherence with other texts in that title and in correspond-
ing titles in the other parts of the Corpus iuris. The Corpus iuris could boast 
a respectable age and the authority of the Christian emperor of the realm 
who had promulgated it as the common law of the Italian territories Justin-
ian’s heritage would have laid the foundation of the medieval German empire 
(politische Romidee) and of medieval arts and sciences (kulturelle Romidee) 
Adopted by the Catholic Church as a subsidiary law, the Corpus iuris spread 
over Europe and, within the context of medieval Europe, it was no longer 
bound by time and borders, as the Roman law of Antiquity had been, either 
classical or Justinianic
It was this awareness of the Corpus iuris which affected the European ius 
commune As a matter of fact, the glossators through fertile misinterpreta-
76) Some argued that the origin of development should indeed be sought in Ro-
man antiquity, see e.g. the article of Baldus and Wacke, in which they parried in 
a subtle and adequate way the criticism of D. Simon & co. on the method of Zim-
mermann: C  Ba ldu s /A  Wa cke ,  Frankfurt locuta, Europa finita? Zur Reinen 
Rechtsgeschichtslehre in Band 12, 1993, des Rechtshistorischen Journals (RJ) und 
zu anderen Zweifeln am Gegenwartswert des Römischen Rechts, in: Zeitschrift für 
Neuere Rechts geschichte 17 (1995) 283–292, 286
77) This belief resulted ia from a number of discussions I had with my colleague 
Tammo Wallinga (Antwerp)
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tions solved most or all inconsistencies between the provisions of Roman law, 
while the commentators further systematized the materials and formulated 
the general rules which apparently underlie the case-based decisions but were 
not yet phrased as such Moreover, medieval jurists were keen to adjust the 
purport of the texts to the needs of their own time However, this was all 
done on the basis of the texts as phrased by the compilers and promulgated 
by Justinian in the sixth century It was this text and not any reconstruction 
of classical law on which medieval scholarship, including Bartolism and the 
mos italicus, focussed It was this text which to some extent penetrated legal 
practice and was commented upon by practice-oriented early modern jurists, 
although at that stage of development the Corpus iuris had become one of 
many legal bodies, relevant for legal practice In the theories of Natural Law, 
it was now used as confirmation, not as substantiation of legal doctrine. Legal 
humanism, which regarded the Corpus iuris as a source of information about 
ancient law and the society of ancient Rome, did not manage to overshadow 
the mainstream of practice-oriented jurists following in the footsteps of Bar-
tolus However, regarding the Corpus iuris as an ageless and universal source 
of law does not go back any further than the era of the glossators. Previous to 
the Bologna school of law there is a wide gap For many centuries, the knowl-
edge of Roman law slumbered in the West and major parts of the Corpus iuris 
fell into oblivion. The trail backwards into history comes to an end around 
1100 No matter at which time and how precisely we draw the line, there is 
a rupture with Late Antiquity and Byzantium, when Roman law was still a 
‘living’ law in the sense of subject to new imperial legislation
Thus, history displays an unbridgeable gap in handling the Corpus iuris. 
In the civilian tradition the Corpus iuris was a code of law and this premise 
dominated legal thinking for many centuries From the perspective of legal 
development through time towards contemporary law, it is impossible to ex-
change this premise for a fundamentally different one, viz that the Corpus 
iuris is a source of knowledge of pre-Justinianic law Regarding the Corpus 
iuris as a collection of texts, displaying the law of Antiquity, implies a fun-
damental change in interpretation It means considering it an archaeological 
site of customary law and imperial jurisprudence and legislation that once 
existed. It means unravelling the Corpus iuris. The latter is possible but would 
be at complete right angles to the medieval understanding of it Moreover, it 
would not be capable of establishing a historical and intellectual continua-
tion between Late Antiquity and the eleventh century. What we would trace, 
following the humanist jurists, are no genetic-functional links in a develop-
ment towards later times. The much praised ‘classical Roman law’ played no 
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role whatsoever in the legal thinking of the glossators and commentators It 
had hardly any relevance for the ius commune but was the result of recon-
structions which humanistic and neo-humanistic scholars produced many 
centuries later. Thus, whoever wishes to understand the civilian tradition 
and its contribution to contemporary law, is well-advised to ignore classical 
law for the simple reason that it can obscure our view Whoever wishes to 
understand the ius commune, should abstain from reading Gaius’ Institutes, 
discovered in 1816, for the simple reason that no jurist in the ius commune 
tradition has ever done so
Finally, there is a didactical consideration, which Zwalve probably had in 
mind, for focussing on Justinianic law in legal education. The latter allows 
us to read the Digest texts in a less complicated way than adopting them as 
reflecting classical law. We can set aside any discussion of linguistics, inter-
polation criticism, palingenesis, litigation of the classical period (formulary 
procedure), the relationship of remedies to the praetorian Edict, rhetoric ele-
ments in the reasoning, differences between Proculians and Sabinians, de-
velopments between early and later classical law, and the method and char-
acteristics of the specific classical jurists under dispute. The same holds true 
for the wider philosophical, social, political and economic context
(v)  Avoid i ng  a nach ron isms:
When going back in time, we also have to realise that there was not always 
a sharp distinction between public law and private law or between the three 
‘branches of power’ as distinguished in later times We should avoid reading 
the historic materials from our present-day perspective which is permeated 
by such distinctions, just as the sharp distinction into the subfields of private 
law, as we know these from our Codes
When teaching legal history and describing the legal sources, there is al-
ways the risk of ending up in structures determined by Natural law, Pan-
dectism or the Civil Codes. This happened to even the neo­humanistic schol-
ars, as their textbooks show At the same time, the applicative approach re-
quires comparison with present­day law. The most legitimate solution seems 
to be to use the Justinianic Institutes or historical commentaries on this 
text, which describe Roman law in its Justinianic, medieval or early modern 
shape78). The Institutes were meant to introduce students to the system and 
principles of the law. They can still serve this purpose. Reading the Institutes 
78) It was my colleague Harry Dondorp who developed and promoted the idea of 
using the Justinian Institutes and commentaries on these Institutes in present-day 
Roman law courses
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is based on a long-standing and continuous European tradition and avoids the 
danger of developing inaccurate conceptions due to the use of anachronistic 
distinctions or explaining Roman law by using anachronistic concepts
In addition, there is nothing wrong with reading and interpreting case-
based texts from the Digest as a didactical exercise, so long as we acknowl-
edge the function these texts must have had in the development of law and 
legal thinking in continental Europe. They could, but should not, be used as 
indirect sources of information about the life and society of Ancient Rome 
during the first centuries of our era. They could, and should, be used to let 
students map out some basic elements of ius commune-doctrine and develop 
their skills in decontextualizing and resubstantializing legal texts from pri-
mary sources
V  Epi log ue:  f u t u re  educa t ion ,  new cou r ses 
a nd  new t ex tbook s
It is surely advisable to continue compulsory courses in legal history, in-
cluding attention to Roman law, preferably based on the premises just de-
scribed, for at least two reasons79). In the first place, such courses can provide 
students with invaluable insights Legal history can show that law is always 
developing and that it is not a static but a dynamic phenomenon Legal his-
tory will open future jurists’ eyes to the fact that some problems are of all 
ages, whereas solutions can sometimes be culture-bound Moreover, students 
will experience the strength of private law dogmatics, derived from Roman 
law and the usus modernus, and the courses will prevent students from being 
obsessed by the details of positive law, enabling them to put present-day law 
into perspective A second reason why legal history is an indispensable part 
of legal education, consists in the fact that the present-day Code of Civil Law 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek) cannot be properly understood or applied without legal 
historical methods. The Code has already a history of its own and one of the 
aids for interpreting the Code is looking at the statutory history of its provi-
sions, ie the legislative process of the Civil Code coming into being, which 
took place from the post-war-years until the beginning of this century In civil 
litigation and doctrine, this statutory history is frequently referred to, but it 
cannot be properly understood without decontextualisation and resubstan-
tialisation. This becomes all the more obvious when the societal and political 
79) It may also be appropriate, to speak no longer about courses in Roman law, but 
about, for example, a course ‘principles of private law’ or ‘historical development 
of private law’
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context of the legislative process of the past is more remote or deviates more 
strongly from the present-day reality in which the various provisions of the 
Code have to function
Drafting legal historical courses and textbooks on the basis of the prem-
ises mentioned, does not require superhuman efforts, but just a certain look 
at Roman law Especially those trained in classical Roman law, will need 
time to adjust and to read Digest texts no longer from the neo-humanistic 
perspective ie as jurists’ replies from the classical period, but from the per-
spective of the ius commune, ie as provisions from a code of law During 
past decades I undertook, on two occasions, to write a textbook based on the 
principles described above Both textbooks and their underlying principles 
were developed on the basis of the practical experience of teaching Roman 
law to undergraduate students and in close consultation with other lecturers 
teaching these courses80). The first book was ‘Fons et origo iuris’, edited for 
the first time in 2006. It described primarily the law of obligations and the 
law of property, but unlike the textbooks of Feenstra and others, the focus 
was now entirely on the Corpus iuris civilis itself Only occasionally was ref-
erence made to classical law Moreover, for three topics, the book described 
the historical development towards present-day law and to some extent also 
the interaction with other legal traditions: transfer of ownership, delict (ex-
tra-contractual liability) and the open or closed system of contract81). The 
textbook was subsequently elaborated for use in Belgium by professor T. 
Wallinga of Antwerp University82). The second book ‘Lijf ende goedt’ was 
specifically written for a law course of seven weeks. It pays more attention 
to external legal history, while the second part of the book focuses more 
strongly upon legal development and the reciprocity between the various le-
gal traditions in continental Europe. This second part deals exclusively with 
extra­contractual liability. The emphasis is on primary sources so as to avoid 
anachronisms and the use of nineteenth century concepts Students learn 
the Roman law of delicts by reading the first titles of Book IV (Inst. 4,1–5) 
of the Justinian Institutes (in Dutch translation). They also read (in Dutch 
translation) a medieval Summa, commenting on the same titles, viz the early 
twelfth century summa ‘Iustiniani est in hoc opere’. This enables them to 
80) I would like to mention here specifically Harry Dondorp, Viola Heutger and 
Hylkje de Jong
81) J  Ha l lebeek ,  Fons et origo iuris, Een historische inleiding tot het vermo-
gensrecht, Amsterdam 32008
82) J  Ha l lebeek / T  Wal l i nga ,  Fons et origo iuris, Versio Belgica, Een his-
torische inleiding tot het vermogensrecht, Amsterdam 32015
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discover how the Roman law of delicts came to life in the Middle Ages. The 
Roman-Dutch law of delict is explained through the commentary of Arnold 
Vinnius (1588–1657), again on the same titles Other traditions, relevant for 
interpreting Roman law texts and the development of extra-contractual li-
ability, such as canon law, indigenous law, early modern scholasticism and 
Natural Law, are fully integrated in the book, while the final chapters deal 
with extra-contractual liability in the major continental codes of civil law, 
present-day developments and some comparison83)
Legal education in the Netherlands has changed dramatically over the past 
thirty years and it is difficult to say when these developments will reach 
a conclusion Educational policy, teaching methods and law schools’ com-
pulsory curricular programmes are subject to continual debate and ongoing 
reforms. It is difficult to say what this will eventually mean for the teaching 
of Roman law and legal history For the time being, we can only continue to 
search for the most appropriate teaching methods in these changing circum-
stances and do our utmost to ensure we address the changing demands84)
83) J  Ha l lebeek  (with the collaboration of JH  Dondor p  and H  de  Jong), 
Lijf ende godet, De juridische bescherming van de menselijke persoon en diens ver-
mogen, Een schets van de continentale rechtsgeschiedenis, Amsterdam 32017
84) This contribution is an elaborated version of a paper delivered on 18 September 
2015 at the MEF University Istanbul on the occasion of the 69th session of the Société 
Internationale Fernand De Visscher pour l’Histoire des Droits de l’Antiquité, dealing 
with the theme “Legal education in Antiquity and law of Antiquity in today’s legal 
curricula”. I would like to thank Boudewijn Sirks (The Hague) for his advice and help 
and Frances Gilligan (Amsterdam) for correcting the English
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